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This paper investigates the dynamics of the term structure of bond market
illiquidity premia using data on German bond market segments which di®er
only with respect to their liquidity. We analyze the interaction between dif-
ferent parts of the term structure and identify economic factors that drive
the illiquidity premia. We obtain three main results: (i) The term structure
of illiquidity premia is U-shaped on average but its shape varies over time.
(ii) There is a strict separation between the short end and the long end of
the term structure of illiquidity premia, i.e. we ¯nd no evidence for spill-over
e®ects across di®erent maturities. Di®erent economic factors drive di®erent
parts of the term structure. The short end is mainly driven by asset mar-
ket volatilities which suggests a °ight-to-liquidity e®ect. In contrast, the long
end depends on long-term business cycle economic prospects. This suggests
that di®erent parts of the term structure are determined by di®erent investor
clienteles with di®erent liquidity needs. (iii) There is a smooth transition from
short-term to long-term illiquidity premia. The longer the time to maturity
of a bond, the less important market volatilities are and the more important
long-term economic prospects become.
JEL Classi¯cation: G12, G13
Keywords: bond liquidity, term structure of illiquidity premia1 Introduction
Liquidity is one of the most important attributes of bond markets. Several pa-
pers show that both, the level of liquidity and liquidity risk, have a strong im-
pact on bond prices leading to higher yields for less liquid bonds (e.g. Amihud,
Mendelson, and Pedersen 2005). Nevertheless, there is still no clear picture
on how illiquidity a®ects bond yields of di®erent maturities. Since a bond's
maturity deterministically changes over time, investors are forced to consider
maturity-speci¯c illiquidity premia within dynamic trading strategies for single
bonds. This is obvious when looking at the well-documented on-the-run/o®-
the-run cycle, but holds more generally. If illiquidity premia depend on time to
maturity, investor's portfolio choice problems are strongly a®ected.1 In addi-
tion, there are implications for the management of liquidity risk. If illiquidity
premia for di®erent maturities are driven by di®erent risk factors, appropriate
hedging instruments di®er accordingly across maturities.
This paper investigates the dynamics of the term structure of bond market
illiquidity premia. We analyze the comovement of short-, medium-, and long-
term illiquidity premia and identify economic factors determining them. Our
results show that the term structure of illiquidity premia is U-shaped on av-
erage but that its shape varies strongly over time. We document a strict
separation between the short end and the long end of the term structure of
illiquidity premia, i.e. there are no spill-over e®ects across di®erent maturities.
We show that di®erent economic factors drive di®erent parts of the term struc-
ture. While the short end is driven by asset market volatilities, the long end
depends on longer-term economic prospects. These results suggest that di®er-
ent parts of the term structure are determined by di®erent investor clienteles
with di®erent liquidity needs. Our results remain stable during the period of
the recent ¯nancial crisis.
The illiquidity premium is typically hard to measure because bond yields are
jointly driven by three main factors: risk-free rate, default premium, and illiq-
uidity premium. To separate the e®ects of the risk-free rate, the default pre-
mium, and the illiquidity premium on bond yields, we use the zero-coupon
1G^ arleanu (2009) theoretically studies portfolio choice problems in illiquid markets and
shows that the liquidity level has indeed a strong impact on asset holdings.
1bond yield di®erence between two bond market segments: German govern-
ment bonds (BUNDs) and German Pfandbriefe. These bond market segments
only di®er with respect to their degree of liquidity but do not di®er in terms
of default risk. The use of zero-coupon bond yields eliminates coupon-e®ects.
Thus, the yield di®erence re°ects the illiquidity premium of the Pfandbrief
market as compared to the BUND market for bonds of di®erent maturities,
i.e. the term structure of illiquidity premia.
Related empirical literature provides evidence on illiquidity premia for di®er-
ent bond market segments. First, there is the burgeoning literature on risky
bonds such as the recent corporate bond studies of Longsta®, Mithal, and Neis
(2005), Lui, Longsta®, and Mandell (2006), Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007),
De Jong and Driessen (2007), Dieck-Nielsen, FeldhÄ utter, and Lando (2009) and
others. They typically have to rely on rather strong assumptions to separate
credit risk from liquidity risk. In contrast, our data allows for a much cleaner
test of the e®ects of illiquidity on bond yields. Second, there is a literature
concentrating on essentially risk-free bonds using predominantly U.S. Treasury
securities. Di®erent studies compare liquid Treasury Bills with more illiquid
Treasury Notes (e.g. Amihud and Mendelson 1991, Kamara 1994) and liq-
uid on-the-run Treasuries with more illiquid o®-the-run Treasuries (e.g. Warga
1992, Krishnamurthy 2002, Goldreich, Hanke, and Nath 2005). In contrast to
our study, they do not focus on the entire term structure of illiquidity premia.
Evidence on the term structure of illiquidity premia is scarce.2 Koziol and
Sauerbier (2007) develop and test an option-theoretical model to quantify illiq-
uidity premia of bonds. Their model predicts a hump-shaped term structure,
but the empirical evidence is weak. Longsta® (2004) studies the yield dif-
ferences between Treasuries and Refcorp bonds and ¯nds a U-shaped term
structure, but his results are based solely on six long-term Refcorp bonds. In
contrast to these papers we study the dynamic linkage between di®erent parts
of the term structure and identify maturity-segment speci¯c determinants of
illiquidity premia.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 brie°y de-
2In an interesting study, Goyenko, Subrahmanyam, and Ukhov (2008) discuss term struc-
ture e®ects of bond market liquidity based on bid-ask spreads. However, they do not analyze
illiquidity premia.
2scribes the structure of the German government bond market and the Pfand-
brief market. Section 3 describes our data set and outlines how the term
structures for these two market segments are estimated. Results on the shape
of the term structure of illiquidity premia are provided in Section 4. Section 5
deals with the determinants of the term structure of illiquidity premia. Sub-
section 5.1 shows results on the dynamic linkages between di®erent parts of
the term structure. In Subsection 5.2 we analyze the impact of additional eco-
nomic factors and Subsection 5.3 takes a look at the impact of the ¯nancial
crisis. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The German Bond Market
Government bonds (BUNDSs) and Pfandbriefe are the most important seg-
ments within the German bond market. In 2007 BUNDs account for about
33% of bonds outstanding and Pfandbriefe have a market share of about 25%.
Similar to the role of US treasuries in the US bond market, BUNDs are the
benchmarks for euro-denominated ¯xed income products with a high level of
liquidity in the secondary market. They play an important role as an under-
lying in derivatives markets, their credit risk is negligible, and they are seen
as a \safe haven" in times of ¯nancial crises.
The second segment with systemic importance for the German ¯nancial sys-
tem are German Pfandbriefe. Pfandbriefe have a benchmark role in the cov-
ered bond market. They are covered by ¯rst rank residential and commercial
mortgages (Mortgage Pfandbriefe) or claims against the public-sector (Public
Pfandbriefe). Pfandbriefe are highly regulated to ensure timely payment as
well as bankruptcy-remoteness, i.e. Pfandbrief investors will not su®er any
untimely repayments or redemption, even if the issuing bank goes into liqui-
dation.3 In contrast to US and UK secured mortgages, the underlying loans
stay on the balance sheet of the mortgage bank.4 There is no prepayment risk
involved since the prepayment of a loan secured by a mortgage is excluded.
Several safeguarding mechanisms protect Pfandbrief investors: (i) Banks must
3See Mastroeni (2001), p. 52.
4See Mastroeni (2001) for a more detailed description of Pfandbriefe and Peterson (2008)
for di®erences between Pfandbriefe and US and UK asset-backed securities.
3ful¯ll special requirements to obtain a licence to engage in the Pfandbrief busi-
ness and are subject to cover audits and permanent supervision beyond the
general banking supervision. (ii) The determination of the quality and size
of the cover assets are subject to conservative guidelines including elements
such as mandatory overcollateralization. (iii) Pfandbrief investors have prior-
ity access to the cover assets in the event of insolvency. Therefore, the German
Pfandbrief is considered to be the safest debt instrument in the private market
and until today there has not been a single case of default.
With respect to interest rate, credit risk, and tax treatment, Pfandbriefe are
well comparable to BUNDs. The standard format is plain vanilla ¯xed coupon.
The issues cover the whole range of maturities from very short term bonds up
to 30 year issues. Currently the prevalent maturity of new issues is about
seven years, the average maturity of outstanding bonds around ¯ve years.
Although some e®ort has been made to enhance liquidity characteristics in
the Pfandbrief market,5 secondary market trading volume is much lower as
compared to BUNDs. Pfandbriefe are perceived to be less liquid than BUNDs
by market participants and the Pfandbrief-BUND spread largely compensates
for di®erences in liquidity.
3 Data
Our analysis is based on term structure data provided by Deutsche Bundes-
bank. Monthly term structure estimates for the BUND market are available
from January 1972 onwards. These are based on the cross section of prices
of all government bonds (Bundesanleihen, Bundesobligationen and Bundes-
schatzanweisungen) with remaining times to maturity of at least three months.
Analogous term structure estimates for the Pfandbrief market are available
from the year 2000 onwards. Therefore, our research period starts in January
2000. As the end of the data period, we choose August 2008. Following the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the major Pfandbrief is-
suer Hypo Real Estate ran into trouble as credit froze on international markets.
Most likely, this event created temporarily a very unusual relation between the
5For example, Jumbo Pfandbriefe with increased standards concerning minimum issue
size, listing, and market making were introduced in 1995.
4BUND and the Pfandbrief market.
To condense the term structure information we use the Nelson and Siegel
(1987) approach. It allows us to characterize the entire term structure through
four parameters only (¯0t, ¯1t, ¯2t, ¿t). Within the Nelson-Siegel framework, a
zero bond yield at time t for time to maturity T is given as













The Nelson-Siegel parameters can be interpreted in terms of a factor represen-
tation. ¯0t, ¯1t, and ¯2t are the factors and ¿t a®ects the factor loadings. To
estimate the parameters for the BUND and the Pfandbrief market, we select
end of month yields with maturities of 3 and 6 months and 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 years for each market from the Bundesbank
data. Following standard practice like in Nelson and Siegel (1987) and Diebold
and Li (2006), we restrict ¿t to be constant over time and, furthermore, to be
identical in the BUND market and the Pfandbrief market. This assumption
implies that factor loadings are the same in both markets and that the magni-
tude of the factors can be directly compared. Estimation is carried out by least
squares, i.e. we minimize the sum of squared yield di®erences over all selected
maturities and both markets. This procedure delivers monthly parameter es-
timates for the BUND market (¯BU
0t ;¯BU
1t , and ¯BU
2t ) and for the Pfandbrief
market (¯PF
0t ;¯PF
1t , and ¯PF
2t ) as well as an overall estimate of ¿ = 2:017. The
latter estimate implies a maximum factor loading of the ¯2t factor at about
four years to maturity.
The factors are closely related to di®erent segments of the term structure. ¯0t
determines the level of the long end of the term structure. Therefore, we call
¯0t the long-term factor. ¯1t is a slope factor that characterizes the di®erence
between short-term and long-term yields. ¯0t+¯1t determines the short end of
the term structure. Therefore, we call ¯0t + ¯1t the short-term factor. ¯2t is a
shape factor that mainly drives medium-term yields. Due to the hump-shaped
form of the corresponding factor loading, a positive value of ¯2t moves the
term structure towards a hump shape and a negative value towards a U-shape.
The development of the estimated long-term factor ¯0, the short-term factor
¯0 + ¯1, and the shape factor ¯2 for the BUND and the Pfandbrief market is
5shown in Figure 1.
[ Insert Figure 1 about here ]
Figure 1 shows that the two markets are clearly linked and the factors move
closely together. However, there are di®erences between the factors of the two
markets resulting from illiquidity premia.
4 Shape of the Term Structure
Given the parameter estimates for the two market segments, the term structure










1t , and ¯SP
2t ´ ¯PF
2t ¡¯BU
2t are the long-term
factor, the short-term factor, and the shape factor of the term structure of
illiquidity premia, respectively. The long-term (short-term) factor measures
the illiquidity premium at the long (short) end of the term structure and the
shape factor a®ects predominantly the medium-term illiquidity premium.
To get a ¯rst impression on the form of the term structure of illiquidity premia,
we calculate the average over all months in the data period. The resulting
average term structure is provided in Figure 2.
[ Insert Figure 2 about here ]
Figure 2 shows that there is a positive average illiquidity premium for all
maturities. However, the premium varies across the di®erent maturities. There
is a clear U-shape in the average term structure of illiquidity premia. The
premia are fairly high at the short end (45 bp) and at the long end (39 bp) of
the term structure, but much lower for medium term bonds (28 bp for bonds
with 3.5 years to maturity). Thus, the price of liquidity is higher for short-
and long-term bonds than for bonds with a medium time to maturity.
Figure 3 shows the development of the term structure of illiquidity premia over
time. It depicts the term structures for each month. The ¯gure shows a strong
variation in the level and in the form of the term structure.
[ Insert Figure 3 about here ]
6We frequently observe U-shaped curves of the illiquidity premia, but also
increasing term structures, strictly decreasing ones, and occasionally hump-
shaped ones. The illiquidity premia are positive at all times for all maturi-
ties, but the level varies heavily. For example, the price of liquidity for short
term bonds is fairly low at the beginning of 2004, but extremely high from
the middle of year 2007 onwards.6 This pattern suggests a °ight-to-liquidity
phenomenon during the ¯nancial crisis. Investors seek the high liquidity of
government bonds and are willing to pay a high price for liquidity. The result
complements the empirical ¯ndings of Beber, Brandt, and Kavajecz (2009)
that ¯xed-income investors care about liquidity especially in times of height-
ened market uncertainty. The impact of the subprime crisis on the price of
liquidity is much more pronounced at the short end than at the long end.
Thus, illiquidity premia at the short and at the long end seem to vary over
time in di®erent ways. This phenomenon becomes even more evident in Fig-
ure 4 which shows the development of the short-term premium (¯SP
0t + ¯SP
1t )
and the long-term premium (¯SP
0t ) as well the evolution of the shape factor
¯SP
2t .
[ Insert Figure 4 about here ]
Part A of Figure 4 shows that there are periods where the illiquidity premium
at the long end is above the one at the short end (for example, August 2004
until February 2006), i.e. liquidity at the long end is more highly priced. In
contrast, from August 2007 to August 2008 investors seem to seek liquidity at
the short end. Almost identical spreads at the long end and the short end are
observed for example between September 2001 and March 2003. The correla-
tion between short-term and long-term illiquidity premia is slightly negative
(-0.13) and not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. This ¯nding suggests that dif-
ferent economic e®ects might be responsible for illiquidity premia at the long
end and the short end of the term structure.
6We checked whether the U-shape documented in Figure 2 is driven by the strong increase
of the short-term premium during the crisis. This is not the case. Even when concentrating
on the pre-crisis period before June 2007, we ¯nd an U-shaped average term structure of
illiquidity premia. At the short end the premium is 38 bp, at the long end 40 bp, and in the
middle segment 24 bp (for bonds with 3.5 years to maturity).
7Part B of Figure 4 shows that the shape factor changes heavily over time. It
is negative most of the time (which explains the U-shape of the average term
structure), but it becomes highly positive at the end of our research period.
5 Dynamics of the Term Structure
5.1 Interactions Within the Term Structure
We now focus on explanations for the estimated illiquidity premia. For this
analysis, we restrict our attention to \normal times", i.e., the period prior
to the subprime crisis. Speci¯cally, we concentrate on the period before June
2007, the month during which two of Bear Stearns' hedge funds ran into prob-
lems.
We ¯rst look at the dynamics of the three factors that represent illiquidity





0t (Long)). We run augmented Dickey-Fuller tests and KPSS tests
to analyze the persistence and mean-reversion of the factors.7 Whereas in the
Dickey-Fuller framework one tests a null hypothesis of a unit root, the KPSS
test uses stationarity as its null hypothesis. For all three time series, augmented
Dickey-Fuller tests do not reject a unit root even at a 10% signi¯cance level.
Using the KPSS test, stationarity is rejected at a 10% signi¯cance level for the
short-term factor. For the long-term factor and the shape factor, stationarity
is rejected at the 5% level. These result indicate that illiquidity premia show
a high persistence and that changes in the premia cannot be predicted based
on deviations from the average premium level.
Next we look at the dynamic linkage between di®erent factors. There might
be spillover e®ects as documented by Goyenko, Subrahmanyam, and Ukhov
(2008). For US government bonds, they show that liquidity shocks at the
7We use the test variants with a constant and without a deterministic time trend. The
number of augmentation terms in the Dickey-Fuller regressions was selected by means of
the pre-test procedure by Hall (1994). As a result, we obtain one augmentation term for
the long-term factor, two for the short-term factor and three for the shape factor. The test
statistic of the KPSS test was adjusted for autocorrelation by applying Newey's and West's
(1987) variance estimate with twelve lags.
8short end of the term structure are transmitted to medium-term and longer
maturities in later periods. In a ¯rst step, we estimate an unrestricted VAR-























































t , and ²l
t denote error terms. The superscripts s, sh, and l stand for
short, shape, and long, respectively. The VAR-model is speci¯ed in levels to
capture possible level relations between the three factors. Information criteria
(AIC and SIC) suggest a lag length of one. As we want to allow for a potential
in°uence of past changes in illiquidity premia, a lag length of two is chosen.
Estimation results are presented in Table 1.
[ Insert Table 1 about here ]
Table 1 provides no evidence for a dynamic interaction between the di®erent
segments of the term structure of illiquidity premia.8 The short-term pre-
mium is exclusively determined by past short-term premia and the long-term
premium exclusively by past long-term premia.9 The estimated correlation
(-0.17) between the error terms ²s
t and ²l
t is low and not statistically signi¯-
cant. These ¯ndings suggest a separation between the short end and the long
end of the term structure of illiquidity premia. Such a separation is con¯rmed
8A possible reason for this ¯nding is that a monthly data frequency might not be su±cient
to identify such a transmission mechanism.
9One should judge the signi¯cance of the coe±cients that refer to lagged explained vari-
ables with caution, however, as the distribution of the test statistic has no standard form
for time series with a unit root. See Sims, Stock, and Watson (1990).
9by the impulse response functions derived from the VAR-model. For example,
a one-standard-deviation shock in the short-term premium (about 9 bp) leads
to a response in the long-term premium of at most 2 bp only over the following
months.
In a second step, we consider a restricted version of the VAR-model that
incorporates possible cointegration relations between the three factors. Based
on Johansen's trace test, we identify one cointegration vector which includes all
three factors. However, the corresponding error correction term only a®ects the
shape factor. Moreover, the existence of one cointegration relation implies that
there are two stochastic trends which drive the dynamics of the system. These
could be identi¯ed as the short end and the long end of the term structure. In
summary, there is a clear separation between the short end and the long end
of the term structure of illiquidity premia.
5.2 Economic Drivers of the Term Structure
The illiquidity premium gives us a measure of the price of liquidity for di®erent
maturities. This price of liquidity should re°ect two economic factors: (i) the
di®erence in liquidity between the two markets (which is determined by the
institutional setting and the market characteristics) and (ii) the importance
which investors attach to liquidity. Therefore, the price of liquidity should
depend on investors' expectations about the necessity to trade in the future.
We capture these economic factors by di®erent proxy variables.
Our proxy for the liquidity di®erence between the BUND and the Pfandbrief
market is based on the volume of recently issued bonds.10 Focussing on re-
cently issued bonds is sensible since trading typically concentrates in on-the-
run bonds.11 Our proxy Volume is de¯ned as the ratio of the volume issued in
the Pfandbrief market and the total volume issued in both markets (Pfandbrief
plus BUND) over the previous six months. We construct separate measures
for three di®erent maturity ranges (< 2 years, 2 ¡ 9 years, ¸ 9 years) which
roughly capture the short end, the middle range, and the long end of the term
structure. The data source is Deutsche Bundesbank.
10Volume is used as a measure of liquidity for example in Krishnamurthy (2002).
11See, e.g., Goldreich, Hanke, and Nath (2005).
10Several papers (e.g. Acharya and Pedersen 2005, Ericsson and Renault 2006,
Koziol and Sauerbier 2007) suggest that the value of liquidity increases with
volatility. The basic economic idea is that in periods when there is a lot of infor-
mation °owing into the market and, consequently, volatility is high, portfolio
revisions become more likely and the value of liquidity increases. Therefore,
we take the volatility in the bond market, Volatility, as an explanatory variable
in our model. We use the daily yields of a one-year government bond and take
its standard deviation within a month as our measure of volatility.
Since there are trading strategies that involve stock and bond markets at the
same time, we also include the volatility of the stock market, VDAX, in our
model. For example, stock market investors might use the bond market as a
\safe haven" when stock market volatility is high. Therefore, we expect that
liquidity in the bond market becomes more important when stock markets are
more volatile. Our proxy for stock market volatility is the VDAX-NEW, the
benchmark volatility index of the German stock market. It is based on implied
volatilities of options on futures on the German stock market index DAX30,
which are traded on EUREX. The VDAX-NEW refers to an option's time to
maturity of 30 days and is provided by Deutsche BÄ orse Group. We use end of
month values for our study.
Investment decisions are also in°uenced by longer-term risks. If the long-term
outlook on ¯nancial markets, personal ¯nances of investors, and the economy
in general is positive, it becomes less risky for an investor to commit herself
to hold an asset over a longer horizon. Therefore, the liquidity of the as-
set becomes less important. Conversely, if the long-term outlook is negative,
the likelihood increases that even long-term investors are eventually unable
to maintain their strategy and might be forced to sell their bonds prior to
maturity. Therefore, even these investors value liquid assets higher than illiq-
uid ones. We proxy the general economic outlook and the long-term risk of
future trading needs by the Ifo business climate index, Ifoindex. The index is
the most prominent indicator of the business climate in Germany. It is based
on the survey responses of about 7,000 German ¯rms and is published on a
monthly basis by the Ifo Institute.12
12Of course, the economic prospects of Germany, as measured by the Ifo index, might not
only in°uence the magnitude of long-term risks but also investors' risk preferences. If the
11In addition to our main explanatory variables, we use several control variables.
First, we control for the net investment of foreign investors in the German bond
market, Foreign, measured in trillions of Euros. Since the Pfandbrief market
is not well known outside Germany, foreign investors might buy government
bonds not for liquidity reasons, but for awareness reasons. Therefore, foreign
net demand might a®ect the Pfandbrief-BUND spread. We take data on net
investments of foreign investors from the monthly ¯nancial market statistics
of Deutsche Bundesbank. Second, we control for credit risk. Although both,
BUNDs and Pfandbriefe, are e®ectively default free, there might be a per-
ception in the market that Pfandbriefe carry some credit risk. If this is the
case, the Pfandbrief-BUND spread would not be entirely liquidity driven. We
take the spread between the Bloomberg EUR Eurozone index of industrial
AA+/AA bond yields and the Bloomberg EUR Eurozone index of industrial
BBB bond yields as our proxy for credit risk.13 This spread measure, Credit,
captures the dynamics of credit risk over time. End of month values are used
for a maturity of one year. Finally, we leave the lagged values of the illiquid-
ity factors as control variables in our model to capture dynamic interactions.
Since our test results from Section 5.1 indicate that the factors have a unit
root, we could otherwise obtain spurious regression results.14 Table 2 provides
summary statistics of our explanatory variables.
[ Insert Table 2 about here ]
To examine the impact of the explanatory variables on the illiquidity premia,
we extend our previous VAR-model to a VAR-model with additional exogenous
variables (VARX-model). We estimate one equation for each factor of the term
structure of illiquidity premia.
outlook is positive, investors might be willing to take higher risks, including liquidity risk,
which leads to a lower price of liquidity. Such an e®ect on risk preferences, however, works
in the same direction as the e®ect on the magnitude of long-term risks.
13We consider the spread between two segments of the corporate bond market and not
a spread between either corporate bonds and BUNDs or corporate bonds and Pfandbriefe
because in the latter cases the spread would also depend on liquidity di®erences between
corporate bonds, BUNDs, and Pfandbriefe.
14See Granger and Newbold (1974). Sims, Stock, and Watson (1990) show that a lagged
endogenous variable in the regression ensures that the asymptotic distribution of the regres-
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The time index t runs from August 2001 to May 2007 since credit spreads
for the Euro denominated Eurozone corporate bond market are not available
before August 2001. Our regression results are provided in Table 3.
[ Insert Table 3 about here ]
Table 3 shows several results: First, our explanatory variables have a signif-
icant impact on the illiquidity premia at the short end and the long end of
the term structure, but cannot explain the shape factor. Second, illiquidity
premia are mainly driven by the uncertainty the investor faces. The higher
the uncertainty, the higher the illiquidity premia. This suggests that investors
are attaching more importance to liquidity in uncertain times. However, there
are di®erent types of uncertainty which determine the short-term and long-
term illiquidity premia. The short-term premium is mainly driven by short-
term volatility in the asset markets whereas the long-term illiquidity premium
is determined by the uncertainty about the long-term economic outlook as
measured by the Ifo index. Thus, distinctly di®erent variables drive di®erent
segments of the term structure.
13In the regression equation of the short-term premium, we see a signi¯cant
impact of the bond market volatility and the stock market volatility. The
positive values of the coe±cients state that higher risks in the bond market
and the stock market lead to higher illiquidity premia. This result is in line with
the argument that a higher volatility causes a higher probability of trading,
which makes the liquidity of an asset more valuable and the BUND market
more attractive. The signi¯cant e®ect of the VDAX only at the short end
suggests that stock market investors enter bonds markets in volatile periods
via short term BUNDs. This is sensible since short term BUNDs provide high
liquidity and low interest rate sensitivity. To illustrate the magnitude of the
volatility e®ects, we consider a simultaneous positive shock of one standard
deviation in bond market and stock market volatility. In response to such a
shock, the illiquidity premium increases by about 6 bp. This is almost one
sixth of the average spread at the short end of the spread curve.
The illiquidity premium at the long end of the term structure is mainly driven
by the Ifo index. A higher index level (which indicates a positive business
climate) leads to a lower illiquidity premium, i.e., the corresponding coe±cient
is negative. If the Ifo index increases by one standard deviation, the long-term
illiquidity premium decreases by more than 4 bp, about ten percent of the
average long-term premium.
Our results suggest that di®erent slopes of the term structure of the illiquidity
premium re°ect di®erent regimes of short- and long-term risk. For example, if
short-term volatility is low and the business climate is bad, we would expect an
upward sloping liquidity spread curve. Conversely, a downward sloping curve
would result from a high volatility and a good business climate.
Surprisingly, the volume of recently issued bonds is insigni¯cant for all three
factors. One explanation for this ¯nding could be that market participants do
not reevaluate their notion of liquidity di®erences between BUND and Pfand-
brief permanently over time but have a rather static view. In this case, volume
e®ects show up only in the constants. In fact, the positive and highly signi¯-
cant constant at the long end of the term structure is consistent with a much
higher volume of long-term BUNDs compared to Pfandbriefe.
When looking at the control variables, we see that the net demand of foreign
investors and the credit variable are never signi¯cant. Therefore, we have
14no evidence that spreads between the Pfandbrief and the BUND market are
driven by credit risk or by the fact that foreigners are only aware of the Bund
market segment. Finally, lagged factors are signi¯cant at the short end and
the long end of the term structure, which con¯rms the persistence of premia
over time.
So far, we have analyzed illiquidity premia in terms of a three-factor repre-
sentation of the term structure. For applications such as portfolio choice and
dynamic trading strategies it is important to know the implications of our
results for illiquidity premia at speci¯c maturities. Our previous ¯ndings sug-
gest that the illiquidity premia of short-term bonds and long-term bonds are
determined by distinct economic factors. We now analyze whether there is a
smooth transition from short-maturity premia to medium- and long-maturity
premia. Table 4 provides the corresponding results for maturities between
three months and 15 years. It shows the estimated coe±cients of regression
models like equations (5) to (7) with maturity-speci¯c illiquidity premia as
dependent variables.
[ Insert Table 4 about here ]
The results indeed suggest a smooth transition. The results for the three-
months premium and the 15-years premium closely resemble the results for
the short-term factor and the long-term factor. For maturities of one and ¯ve
years, stock market volatility is still signi¯cant. For the ten-years premium,
stock market volatility looses its explanatory power, but the Ifo index becomes
now signi¯cant at the 5% level. Thus, short-term volatility becomes the more
important for the illiquidity premium the shorter the maturity of a bond.
Longer-term economic prospects, however, gain importance for bonds with
longer maturities. These ¯ndings further support the hypothesis of investor
clienteles with di®erent liquidity needs.
5.3 In°uence of the Financial Crisis
The ¯nancial crisis that began in summer 2007 has been a major disruption
for many ¯nancial markets and the way investors perceive the risks they face.
15Therefore, we test whether our main ¯ndings remain stable under such cir-
cumstances. As a robustness check, we repeat our analysis using data until
August 2008.15 The results for the VARX-model are given in Table 5.
[ Insert Table 5 about here ]
Table 5 shows that the separation between short-term and the long-term pre-
mia remains qualitatively unchanged. Short-term volatility still determines the
short end of the term structure of illiquidity premia, whereas long-term risk
determines the long end. Interestingly, the coe±cients of the credit spread
variable are now positive in all three equations. The p-values of 8.4% for
the short-term factor and 9% for the long-term factor suggest that credit risk
gained importance during the crisis even in the Pfandbrief market. In this
respect, the crisis clearly makes a di®erence.
6 Conclusions
The German bond market o®ers a unique testing ground for liquidity studies:
essentially default-free bonds with very similar characteristics that only di®er
with respect to their liquidity are traded along the entire maturity spectrum.
In this paper, we take advantage of this situation to examine the term structure
of illiquidity premia. In a novel empirical approach, we compare the spread
between yields of the liquid BUND market and the relatively less liquid (but
otherwise similar) Pfandbrief market for bonds of di®erent maturities. This
spread re°ects the illiquidity premium of the Pfandbrief market as compared
to the BUND market for bonds of di®erent maturities, i.e. the term structure
of illiquidity premia.
Our examination of the dynamics of the term structure of illiquidity premia
over time delivers several novel ¯ndings: The term structure of illiquidity pre-
mia is typically not °at but U-shaped and not constant over time, re°ecting
the impact of a changing economic environment. The short end and the long
end of the term structure of illiquidity premia are strictly separated, i.e. there
15We cannot analyze the crisis period separately since there are only 19 monthly observa-
tions.
16are no spill-over e®ects. The short end of the term structure is mainly driven
by the volatility of bond and equity markets. If the volatility rises, so does
the short-term illiquidity premium. This is consistent with a °ight-to-liquidity
argument in turbulent times: if volatility on markets increases, many investors
shift their portfolio into the more liquid short-term government bonds. This
demand e®ect leads to an increase in the price of liquidity. The long-term
illiquidity premia are driven by the long-term economic outlook. This ¯nding
indicates that long-term investors facing an increased risk of early liquidation
during an economic downturn are willing to pay a higher price for liquidity of
the long-term bonds they typically hold. Given the di®erent risk factors that
drive long- and short-term liquidity premia, investors need di®erent instru-
ments for hedging liquidity risk for long- and short-term bonds. The illiquidity
premia of medium-term bonds are driven by short-term risk factors and long-
term risk factors. If the time to maturity is steadily increased, one observes
a decreasing in°uence of short-term risk factors and an increasing in°uence of
the long-term economic outlook. The results are stable even when including
the period of the recent ¯nancial crisis.
Overall, these results suggest that illiquidity premia depend mainly on the
value that investors are attributing to liquidity. Furthermore, the illiquid-
ity premia of short- and long-term bonds depend on di®erent variables which
are important for di®erent investor clienteles: while long-term investors care
about the long-term economic outlook, short-term investors are more con-
cerned about the possibility of quick portfolio rebalancing. This ¯nding in-
dicates that di®erent investor clienteles for short- and long-term bonds are
responsible for the cross-sectional di®erence in the determinants of illiquidity
premia among these bonds.
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19Table 1: Joint dynamics of illiquidity premia: VAR(2)-model.
Short-term Shape Long-term
factor factor factor
Constant 0.0597 0.1640 0.0030
(0.0341) (0.1493) (0.0565)
Short-term (t-1) 0.5963** -0.8460 0.2278
(0.0991) (0.4519) (0.1440)
Short-term (t-2) 0.2314** 0.2115 -0.1191
(0.0591) (0.5103) (0.1166)
Shape (t-1) -0.0010 0.1259 0.0215
(0.0329) (0.1188) (0.0400)
Shape (t-2) 0.0175 0.0250 0.0092
(0.0305) (0.1150) (0.0290)
Long-term (t-1) 0.0081 -0.0725 0.5647**
(0.0947) (0.3185) (0.1276)
Long-term (t-2) 0.0168 -0.8737** 0.3770**
(0.0838) (0.3301) (0.1017)
R2 0.62 0.37 0.75
Signi¯cant at * 5% level, ** 1% level.
This table shows the results for a VAR(2)-model of the illiquidity factors. The data period
is January 2000 to May 2007 (87 observations). Standard errors of the coe±cients are given
in parentheses. They are based on Newey's and West's (1987) covariance matrix estimator
with ten lags.
20Table 2: Summary statistics of potential drivers of illiquidity premia.
Standard
Mean Deviation Minimum Median Maximum
Volume (short) 0.6226 0.2638 0.1695 0.5151 1.0000
Volume (medium) 0.6110 0.0602 0.5033 0.6063 0.7909
Volume (long) 0.2419 0.1152 0.0850 0.2153 0.6151
Volatility 0.0611 0.0320 0.0183 0.0534 0.2354
VDAX 24.50 10.38 12.32 20.96 60.03
Ifo index 96.40 6.10 87.10 95.40 108.80
Foreign 0.0094 0.0104 -0.0152 0.0093 0.0323
Credit 0.2856 0.1673 0.1157 0.2190 0.7834
This table shows some summary statistics of potential drivers of illiquidity premia. The
data period is January 2000 to May 2007 (89 observations) for most variables. Due to data
limitations credit spreads refer to the period August 2001 to May 2007 (70 observations).
21Table 3: Drivers of illiquidity premia: VARX-model.
Short-term Shape Long-term
factor factor factor
Constant 0.2384 -0.5919 0.9083**
(0.3231) (1.5190) (0.2548)
Volume -0.0755 -1.0222 0.2499
(0.0534) (1.2048) (0.2428)
Volatility 0.8635** -0.1640 -0.6838
(0.2682) (1.9157) (0.3940)
VDAX 0.0029** 0.0135 -0.0023
(0.0011) (0.0096) (0.0025)
Ifo index -0.0024 0.0129 -0.0071**
(0.0025) (0.0095) (0.0019)
Foreign -0.0317 -0.2001 0.5493
(0.9462) (3.7893) (1.4758)
Credit -0.0169 -0.8399 0.1707
(0.0787) (0.7250) (0.1893)
Short-term (t-1) 0.6481** -0.7844 -0.0343
(0.0925) (0.6149) (0.1440)
Short-term (t-2) 0.1072 0.2025 -0.0547
(0.0808) (0.5820) (0.1994)
Shape (t-1) 0.0512* 0.0355 -0.0100
(0.0234) (0.1579) (0.0474)
Shape (t-2) 0.0478 -0.0171 0.0029
(0.0334) (0.1800) (0.0362)
Long-term (t-1) 0.0803 -0.2862 0.2658
(0.1072) (0.5504) (0.1531)
Long-term (t-2) 0.0791 -0.8355 0.2338*
(0.1497) (0.4547) (0.1181)
R2 0.77 0.33 0.45
Signi¯cant at * 5% level, ** 1% level.
This table shows the results for the VARX-model, which includes di®erent explanatory
variables for the illiquidity factors. The data period is August 2001 to May 2007 (70 ob-
servations). Standard errors of the coe±cients are given in parentheses. They are based on
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Constant 0.0220 -0.9331 0.7593**
(0.3502) (1.3692) (0.1988)
Volume -0.1565* -1.2005 0.1924
(0.0707) (0.9078) (0.2176)
Volatility 1.2385* -1.0140 -0.5508
(0.5822) (1.4557) (0.3350)
VDAX 0.0022* 0.0029 -0.0020
(0.0010) (0.0058) (0.0016)
Ifo index -0.0004 0.0156 -0.0058**
(0.0029) (0.0086) (0.0017)
Foreign 0.3561 -0.5521 0.9394
(1.0581) (3.7632) (1.0573)
Credit 0.1290 0.0752 0.1703
(0.0746) (0.3150) (0.1003)
Short-term (t-1) 0.9500** -1.2335** 0.0559
(0.1039) (0.3084) (0.0606)
Short-term (t-2) -0.1450 1.4088** -0.1348
(0.1390) (0.4261) (0.1033)
Shape (t-1) 0.1315** 0.097 0.0013
(0.0441) (0.0851) (0.0310)
Shape (t-2) 0.0686 0.1193 0.0085
(0.0358) (0.1120) (0.0259)
Long-term (t-1) 0.2748* -0.3674 0.3247**
(0.1398) (0.4188) (0.1223)
Long-term (t-2) 0.0426 -0.5783 0.2213*
(0.1512) (0.5002) (0.1030)
R2 0.81 0.40 0.46
Signi¯cant at * 5% level, ** 1% level.
This table shows the results for the VARX-model, which includes di®erent explanatory
variables of the illiquidity factors. The data period is August 2001 to August 2008 (85
observations). Standard errors of the coe±cients are given in parentheses. They are based
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